




Ix commercial affairs time is an element both of importance and
of pecuniary value. The maritime law seeks to enforce promptitude
in the performance of the various obligations arising out of the
hiring of ships.
The vessel is required to make the voyage in as short a time as
may be found consistent with reason and safety, and compensation
may be had for the various acts of commission or omission which
tend to delay the loading or discharge. The unprofitable detention
of a ship whilst thus engaged may result from the negligence.of.the
master, from the neglect of the freighter or consignee, or from causes,
beyond- the control of the parties; the fact that delay is being paid
for often makes the master remiss, whilst the merchant, for divers
reasons, not unfrequently fails to perform his duty of speeding the
vessel, and thus inflicts a corresponding loss upon the ship-owner.
It might naturally be imagine4 that causes of this character would
lead to frequent differences, but it might also well be supposed
at this late day, that the reciprocal rights, duties and obligations
of ship-owners, shippers and consignees would be so well settled
that adjudications thereon would rarely be called for. Such, how-
ever, does not seem to be the case; on both sides of the Atlantic
suits for the recovery of'demurrage continue to furnish a most fruit-
.ful source of litigation.
The term demurrage was formerly supposed to include all claims
in the nature of delay or detention which were capable of being
ascertained and paid for, either at a rate agreed -on, or by an
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DEMURRAGE.
amount calculable at so much per ton, or by damages to be
subsequently estimated and arrived at. Modern English cases
have, however, dealt with demurrage on a different footing,
by drawing a hard and fast line between cases originating in the
breach of an express contract and actions for damages for detention
in the nature of demurrage, resulting from the breach of the con-
tract implied by law.
This, however, is not the case in America. In our courts every
improper detention of a vessel, whether arising in consequence
of the time lost in making -the necessary repairs occasioned by a
collision, or by reason of the breach of a contract, express or
implied, liquidated or unliquidated, as capable of being ascertained
and paid for, may so be recovered by action brought eo nomine,
the claim is considered in its commercial aspect, free from techni-
calities or mere points of form, as an extended freight or reward to
the vessel for the earnings she is improperly compelled to lose: The
Apollon, 9 Wheat. 378; "Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 101;
Sprague v. West, Abb. Ad. Rep. 548.
The contract of hiring usually contains a demurrage clause, or a
provision reciting the dispatch or number of days agreed upon in
advance as the measure of time to be consumed, and also the terms
upon which delay, if occurring, is to be compensated for. If no
such provision be contained in the charter-party or bill of lading,
the law will imply a contract to perform the requisite duty with
reasonable promptitude or within a reasonable time.
To enforce his claim, the injured party, if he has not parted
with his lien may, in general, proceed in rem or in personam at his
election. The former remedy is, however, for obvious reasons in
general the more efficacious. Ships may be employed by their
owners, or they may be let to others ; their cargoes may be made
up of merchandise belonging to their owners or to strangers; there
may be one shipper and one consignee, one shipper and several
consignees, or several shippers and several consignees. When'the
vessel is not chartered, if there be any stipulation for demurrage,
it will be found in the bill of lading, and such is usually the case in
the American coasting trade, which is carried on exclusively in our
own bottoms, and generally in vessels of moderate carrying
capacity. " General ships," ordinarily, as well as vessels "going
foreign," are usually under charter, and, in such an event, if there
be more than one bill of lading the terms and conditions of car-
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riage, loading and delivery may in the case of each individual
shipper or consignee be different. If, therefore, the vessel be
chartered, recourse should generally be had to both the charter-
party and bill or bills of lading in determining questions of
demurrage.
As between the parties to the contract the rule is that when the
time is expressly ascertained and limited by its terms the merchant
will be liable if the thing be not done within the stipulated time,
unless the detention be occasioned by the default of the shipowner or
his servant; and this on the ground that if the delay be occasioned
by the wrongful acts of others, there exists a remedy against them,
but the circumstance that there was no fault or omission on his part
is no defence, because he has by his contract stipulated that it
should be done, and he is therefore responsible for all the various
vicissitudes which may prevent him from accomplishing that which
he has undertaken, and accordingly it has been.held that delays in
loading or in unloading a vessel beyond her running days, if occa-
sioned by frost or by prohibition of a foreign government, or by
custom-house regulation, or by an unlawful seizure, or by the
crowded state of the docks, or by the state of the weather, or by
the default of the shippers, or by a casualty, cause or accident other
than the default of the shipowner or his servant, are misfortunes
which must fall upon the freighter: Barret v. Dutton, 4 Camp. 333-
Barker v. Hodgson, 3 M. & S. 267; Hill v. Idle, 4 Camp. 327;
Bessy v. -Jvans, Id. 181; _andall v. Lynch, 2 Id. 852; Fenwicek
v. Schmaltz, L. R., 3 0. P. 813; Jones v. Adamson, 1 Exch.
Div..60; Leer v. Yates, 3 Taunt. 887; Straker v. Xidd, 3 Q. B.
Div. 223; Porteus v. Watney, Id. 534. Apparent hardship is,
in such cases, no mitigation, and it has been-held that where a
general ship has been delayed by the fault of one of the consignees,
demurrage may be recovered against the other consignees for the
whole of the delay, although it be occasioned by no fault of theirs:
Leer v. Yates, supra ; This v. Byers, 1 Q. B. Div. 244 ; Straker
v. fKidd, supra; Porteus v. Watney, supra. The liability of the
parties may, of course, be changed or controlled by special terms
in the charter or bill of lading: Oglesby v. The Yglesias, 27 L. J.
Q. B. 356; -Peterson v. Lotinger, 20 Law Times 267.
A provision in a charter-party exempting the charterer from
liability for detention "unless by default of the charterer," exempts
him only from delay by reason of causes which are beyond his
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control, and which act directly to retard the undertaking. If,
therefore, the delay be caused by bad weather, or by the act of the
municipal authorities, no liability exists as against him: The Mary
-E. Tabor, 1 Benedict 105; Towle v. Kettell, 5 Cush. 18. But
he will be held to a strict performance of his contract notwith-
standing this provision, unless the default be'occasioned by a direct
vismajor, or something like it: Thatcher v. Boston Gaslight Co.,
2 Lowell 361; Davis v. -Pendergast, 16 Blatchf. 565. The
burthen of proving the default is in such cases on the shipowner
or his servant: Towle v. Cushing, supra.
Instead of contracting that the work shall be performed in a
certain number of days, words of technical meaning are sometimes
instead inserted. The word "direct" in a charter-party means that
the vessel shall, take a direct course from the port of departure to
the port of destination, without deviation or unreasonable delay:
The Onrust, 6 Blatchf. 533. ", Running days" mean every day
that ship could run: Cochran v. Betberg, 3 Esp. 121. "Work-
ing days" exclude Sundays and legal holidays. If the word
"days" simply is used, running days are meant, unless there be
some special usage to the contrary: Brown v. Johnson, 10 M. &
W. 331; Nieman v. Moss, 29 L. J. Q. B. 206; Commercial Steam-
ship Co. v. Boulton, L. -R:, 10 Q. B. 346. "Rainy days" mean
only those 'days on which the rain-fall is Such as to interfere with
the execution of the work with safety and convenience: Balfour
v. Wilkins, 5 Sawyer 429.
"Dispatch" means -without delay, it does not mean with due
diligence, nor does it refer to any usages, customs or rules of the
port. The charterer who stipulates for dispatch in discharging
takes all the risk of being able to' effect such a discharge, and if he
is obliged from any cause to detain the ship he must pay the demur-
rage, and this stipulation places upon the consignee the duty of
taking the C argo as rapidly as the vessel could have delivered it, and
also of obtaining a place of discharge for the vessel without delay.
For failure in either regard he will be liable: Sleeper v. Ping, 17
Blatchf. 36. A covenant to load with "usual dispatch" excludes
every delay on the part of the shipper beyond the ordinary time
for bringing the cargo to the place of landing and loading: Haeron
v. Pearson, 7 H. & N. 386. "Quick dispatch in discharging"
excludes all delays save the time employed in unloading and
delivering the cargo, unless they be occasioned by natural causes
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beyond the control of the contracting party: Davis v. Wallace, 8
Clifford 123. ;. Customary dispatch" includes usages of the port,
such as working hours, the order in which vessels must come to the
wharf,; and the observance of holidays, but, it does not include any
delay which is purely voluntary on the part of* the merchant,
although such delay be usual in his trade: Lindsay v. Cusirnano,
10 Fed. Rep. 303; 12 Id. 503.
An agreement for' "dispatch in discharging" or for "quick
dispatch" supersedes any custom of the port: Thatcher v. Boston
Gaslight Co., supra; Keen v. Audenried, 5 Benedict 535; Davis
v. Wallace, supra; Sleeper v. .Puig, supra.
When there is no special contract the usage of the port in
respect to the reception and delivery of the cargo is frequently a
matter of material consideration, but usage cannot prevail over or
nullify the express provisions of the contract: Bliven v. New
.England Screw Co., 23 How. 431. Proof of; usage-is admitted
either to interpret the meaning of the language of the contract, or
to ascertain its nature and effect in the absence of express
stipulation when the meaning is equivocal and obscure. But
proof of usage is not admissible to contradict express stipulations
or to vary the language employed by the parties when the meaning
is expressed in plain and unambiguous terms: The Reeside, 2
Sumn. 569.
'When the bill of lading contains a stipulation for demurrage,
either expressly or by reference to the charter-party, the acceptance
of the goods has been held to be evidence of an agreement by the
consignee to pay demurrage as.well as freight: Jesson v. Solly, 4
Taunt. 52. But where no express contract exists, courts of com-
mon law have generally held that the consignee or his assignee is
not liable for demurrage, even after the receipt of the goods: Gage
v. Morse, 12 Allen 410; Young v. Moeller, 5 E. & B. 755. The
reason being that as the consignee is not a party to the contract,
the bill of lading, he is only liable upon the contract to pay freight,
and is therefore not bound to accept the cargo at any particular
time, and incurs no responsibility by reason of delay; that the
contract implied from acceptance extends no further than the con-
ditions upon which delivery is made to depend by the bill of lading.
As a result, the consignee remained exempt from an action at law
for his own neglect, and the master being obliged, in order to obtain
his freight to deliver his cargo, became thus deprived of his lien or
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right of action thereon for the demurrage, and was remanded to a
foreign jurisdiction in which to sue the shipper. In England,
Parliament came to his relief, and it was provided by statute that
the consignee or assignee who receives the cargo is entitled to all
the rights and subjected to all the liabilities of the contracting
party : Smurthwaite v. Wilkins, 11 0. B. (N. S.) 842.
In America an equally beneficial result has been obtained by
the refusal of the Admiralty Court to follow the 'common-law
decisions. And it has accordingly been held that when the con-
signee is the freighter or the owner of a cargo he is liable in
damages for any detention in loading or unloading occasioned by
his own conduct, although the bill of lading contained no express
contract therefor: Sprague v. Vest, Abbott's Admiralty Rep. 548 ;
Railroad Co. v. Northam, 2 Benedict 1; Bobbins v. Welsh, 9
Phila. R. 409.
The delivery of the bill of lading is a delivery of the cargo, and
creates a privity between the parties: The Schooner Mary Ann
Guest, Olcott's Rep. 498; Griffith v. Ingledew, 6 S. & R. 429;
Conard v. Ins. Co., 1 Peters 446.
If there be no express contract to pay demurrage,.there can be
no recovery unless the detention be occasioned by the delinquency
of the consignee: The Glover, 1 Brown's Admiralty Rep. 166;
Wordin v. Bemis, 32 Conn. 268.
It not infrequently happens that the bills of lading contain
words or phrases which give notice of the existence of the charter-
party without definitely stating therein the provisions in regard to
demurrage, and it thus occurs that a shipper of goods may be so
fixed with liabilities of which he is nowise apprised save by such
notice, he not being a party to chartering the vessel, and having,
perhaps, no other acquaintance with its terms or conditions. A
sense of the hardship springing from this doctrine of constructive
notice when pushed to its extreme limits, doubtless influenced some
of the earlier decisions, but the general tenor of those of later date
is to charge a shipper with the terms of the charter-party, if, by
reasonable imputation, he may be supposed to have had notice of
them, subject, however, to the rule that when it is intended to
charge a consignee or endorsee of a bill of lading with any other
obligation than the payment of freight, plain words should be
used: Chappel v. Comfort, 31 L. J., C. P. 58; Grey v. Carr,
L. R., 6 Q. B. 522; Russell v. Niemann, 33 L. J., C. P. 358;
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Young v. Mloeller, 5 E. & B. 755; Gage v. Morse, 94 Mass.
401. If the words of incorporation in the bill of lading are
"paying for said goods as per charter-party," no liability sub-
sists for demurrage, but aliter if the clause of incorporation be
"freight and other conditions as per charter-party :" Smith v.
Sieveking, 4 E. & B. 945; Wegener v. Smith, 24 L. J., 0. P. 25.
But even though the bill of lading contain no reference to the
charter-party whatever, it may, notwithstanding, operate in con-
nection with that document to charge the shipper or charterer's
own agent: .o8ter v. Colby, 3 H. & N. 705. When delay
happens without fault on either side, neither party having under-
taken by contract, express or implied, that there should be no
delay, the loss must remain where it falls: _iord v. Cotesworth,
L. R., 4 Q. B. 127; Cargo ex Argos, L. R., 5 P. 0. 134.
In the absence of an express contract for demurrage, there is an
implied contract on the part of the" consignee, if he receives the
goods, that he will use reasonable diligence in effecting their dis-
charge, and he will be liable in such an event for detention occur-
ring by reason of his own negligence, notwithstanding the fact that
the vessel has been employed by the shipper: Crawford v. M11ellor,
1 Fed. Rep. 638. And it would seem that a consignee of goods,
when notified by the carrier of his readiness to deliver them, should
either refuse to receive them or use reasonable diligence to effect
their discharge: Fulton v. BlaNe, 5 Bissell 371. But in the
absence of any provision for demurrage, the only obligation in
respect to discharge which rests upon the consignee, is that of
proper or customary, diligence, and when a delay occurs, no lia-
bility can be imposed upon him without showing negligence on his
part: Henley v. The Ice Co., 14 Blatch. 522. And it would seem
that he is not, in such a case, responsible for the delay which
ensues in consequence of the vessel's being obliged to await her
turn, if such be the customary method of discharge, unless there
be proof of negligence on his part: Hfenley v. The Ice Co., 8upra ;
Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; The Glover, 1 Brown's Ad. R. 166;
Wordin v. Bemis, 32 Conn. 2"68. If the bill of lading or charter-
party require "dispatch" in discharging, the master can claim
precedence, notwithstanding the fact that there exists a custom to
the contrary: Keen v. Audenried, 5 Benedict 535.
To earn demurrage a vessel must not only arrive but be ready
to deliver her cargo-: Aylward v. Smith, 2 Lowell 195.
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The period from which the lay days begin to run depend on
various'circumstances connected with the port, and upon the form of
contract. The test being whether or not the ship has arrived at the
usual or agreed place of discharge: Tapscott v. Bafour, L. R., 8
C. P. 46; Asheroft v. The Orchard Co., L. R., 9 Q. B. 540; Ship
Co. v. Dempsey, 1 C. P. Div. 654; This v. Byers, 1 Q. B. Div.
244; Davies v. Me Teagh, 4 Ex. Div. 265 ; Postlethwait v. .Feeed-
land, Id. 155; Wright v. New Zealand Shipping Co., Id. 165.
The general rule is that in the absence of contract or custom
to the contrary the days are reckoned from the arrival of the ship
at the usual place of discharge, and not at the port, and this is
true even though for the purposes of facilitating navigation a por-
tion of the cargo may have been discharged at the entrance of the
port: Brierton v. Captain, 7 Bing. 559; Kill v. Anderson, 10
M. & W. 498; Rowe v. Smith, 10 Bos. 268.
As soon as the period arrives at which the owner of the cargo
is bound to accept part delivery, the voyage as to him, is at an
end. If by the usages of the port a part of the cargo has been
aischarged in two different places within the port, both places
taken together constitute the usual place of discharge, and lay
days begin to run from the time of the ship's arrival at the port:
McIntosh v. Sinclair, 11 Irish Rep., C. L. 456.
But if part of the cargo be discharged at one wharf and
part at another and no objection be made thereto at the time it
will be assumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that it
was done in" accordance with custom, and the charterers will not be
chargeable for the time thus consumed: The Cargo of the Alary
-. Tabor, 1 Benedict 105; 268 Logs of Cedar, 2 Lowell 378.
If the usual place of discharge be at a dock, the general rule is
the days would begin to run from the period of the vessel's arrival
at the dock, and not from the time of coming to her berth : Brown
v. Johnson, 10 M. & W. 331. This, however, may be modified by
proof that in the case of vessels engaged in particular trade, lay
days begin to run from the time of mooring: Steamship Co. v.
Dempsey, L. R., 1 0. P. Div. 654.
When no wharf is named in the contract, or in the absence of
a custom to the contrary, the master of a general ship may go to
a suitable wharf and notify the consignees, who are then bound to
take their goods from the wharf: Cope v. Cordova, 1 Lowell 103;
The Tangier, 21 Law Rep. 8.
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A discharge of goods upon the wharf, giving reasonable notice
to the consignee, constitutes a delivery: The Eddy, 5 Wallace
481. But if there has not been a delivery to the consignee or
shipper personally, the substituted delivery must be justified:
Gatliff v. Bourne, 4 Bing. N. C. 314 ; Humphreys v. Reed, 6
Whart. 435; Hemphill v. Chenie, 6 W. & S. 62.
A formal notice to the consignee of the readiness of the vessel
to receive her cargo is not necessary if they knew that she was
ready. That they did know it may be inferred from circumstances,
so far, at least, as to throw upon them the burthen of proof: 268
Log8 of Cedar, 2 Lowell 378.
It seems that the consignee of goods under a bill of lading, if
he is the only person having goods on board of the ship, or all
the consignees, if they are unanimous, have the right to direct the
master to unload at any usual and convenient wharf within the
limits of the port, or, in the case of a general ship, the master
may lawfully proceed to any such wharf without consulting the
shippers. The question is one of custom rather than of law: B.
Hf. Pitler, 1 Lowell 114. When there are two or more wharves
equally convenient to the carrier, he is bound to deliver at the
wharf which is most convenient to the shipper: The Boston, 1
Lowell 164. The wharf selected must be safe and unencumbered.
The naming of a wharf by the consignee is a warranty that a berth
can be had there : Thatcher v. Boston Gas Light Co., 2 Lowell 361.
Delays within the port for a considerable time owing to a want of
sufficient water at the place of delivery, do not require the freighter
to receive the cargo at another place or change the general rule in
-regard to period at which lay days begin, and tliis is true although
the contract stipulates that the ship was to go only so near the
place as she could safely get: Aylward v. Smith, 2 Lowell, supra;
Parker v. Winlow, 7 Ellis & B. 902 ; Bastifeel v. Lloyd, 1 Hurls.
& C. 388. When the amount of demurrage has been agreed upon
or stipulated for in advance, the quantum of damages will, in
general, be regulated in accordance with its terms, but when this is
not the case, the measure of damages is to be determined by the
amount of freight earned under the contract, subject to a deduc-
tion of the expense to which the shipowner has been subjected:
Smith V*. Me Guire, 27 L. J. Ex. 465.
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